A recent method for solving zero-sum partially observable stochastic games (zs-POSGs) embeds the original game into a new one called the occupancy Markov game. This reformulation allows applying Bellman's principle of optimality to solve zs-POSGs. However, improving a current solution requires solving a linear program with exponentially many potential constraints, which significantly restricts the scalability of this approach. This paper exploits the optimal value function's novel uniform continuity properties to overcome this limitation. We first construct a new operator that is computationally more efficient than the state-of-the-art update rules without compromising optimality. In particular, improving a current solution now involves a linear program with an exponential drop in constraints. We then also show that point-based value iteration algorithms utilizing our findings improve the scalability of existing methods while maintaining guarantees in various domains.

We consider a variant of continuous-state partially-observable stochastic games with neural perception mechanisms and an asymmetric information structure. One agent has partial information, with the observation function implemented as a neural network, while the other agent is assumed to have full knowledge of the state. We present, for the first time, an efficient online method to compute an $\varepsilon$-minimax strategy profile, which requires only one linear program to be solved for each agent at every stage, instead of a complex estimation of opponent counterfactual values. For the partially-informed agent, we propose a continual resolving approach which uses lower bounds, pre-computed offline with heuristic search value iteration (HSVI), instead of opponent counterfactual values. This inherits the soundness of continual resolving at the cost of pre-computing the bound. For the fully-informed agent, we propose an inferred-belief strategy, where the agent maintains an inferred belief about the belief of the partially-informed agent based on (offline) upper bounds from HSVI, guaranteeing $\varepsilon$-distance to the value of the game at the initial belief known to both agents.

Stochastic games are a well established model for multi-agent sequential decision making under uncertainty. In reality, though, agents have only partial observability of their environment, which makes the problem computationally challenging, even in the single-agent setting of partially observable Markov decision processes. Furthermore, in practice, agents increasingly perceive their environment using data-driven approaches such as neural networks trained on continuous data. To tackle this problem, we propose the model of neuro-symbolic partially-observable stochastic games (NS-POSGs), a variant of continuous-space concurrent stochastic games that explicitly incorporates perception mechanisms. We focus on a one-sided setting, comprising a partially-informed agent with discrete, data-driven observations and a fully-informed agent with continuous observations. We present a new point-based method, called one-sided NS-HSVI, for approximating values of one-sided NS-POSGs and implement it based on the popular particle-based beliefs, showing that it has closed forms for computing values of interest. We provide experimental results to demonstrate the practical applicability of our method for neural networks whose preimage is in polyhedral form.

State-of-the-art methods for solving 2-player zero-sum imperfect information games rely on linear programming or regret minimization, though not on dynamic programming (DP) or heuristic search (HS), while the latter are often at the core of state-of-the-art solvers for other sequential decision-making problems. In partially observable or collaborative settings (e.g., POMDPs and Dec- POMDPs), DP and HS require introducing an appropriate statistic that induces a fully observable problem as well as bounding (convex) approximators of the optimal value function. This approach has succeeded in some subclasses of 2-player zero-sum partially observable stochastic games (zs- POSGs) as well, but how to apply it in the general case still remains an open question. We answer it by (i) rigorously defining an equivalent game to work with, (ii) proving mathematical properties of the optimal value function that allow deriving bounds that come with solution strategies, (iii) proposing for the first time an HSVI-like solver that provably converges to an $\epsilon$-optimal solution in finite time, and (iv) empirically analyzing it. This opens the door to a novel family of promising approaches complementing those relying on linear programming or iterative methods.

From the very dawn of the field, search with value functions was a fundamental concept of computer games research. Turing's chess algorithm from 1950 was able to think two moves ahead, and Shannon's work on chess from $1950$ includes an extensive section on evaluation functions to be used within a search. Samuel's checkers program from 1959 already combines search and value functions that are learned through self-play and bootstrapping. TD-Gammon improves upon those ideas and uses neural networks to learn those complex value functions -- only to be again used within search. The combination of decision-time search and value functions has been present in the remarkable milestones where computers bested their human counterparts in long standing challenging games -- DeepBlue for Chess and AlphaGo for Go. Until recently, this powerful framework of search aided with (learned) value functions has been limited to perfect information games. As many interesting problems do not provide the agent perfect information of the environment, this was an unfortunate limitation. This thesis introduces the reader to sound search for imperfect information games.

Technology development efforts in autonomy and cyber-defense have been evolving independently of each other, over the past decade. In this paper, we report our ongoing effort to integrate these two presently distinct areas into a single framework. To this end, we propose the two-player partially observable stochastic game formalism to capture both high-level autonomous mission planning under uncertainty and adversarial decision making subject to imperfect information. We show that synthesizing sub-optimal strategies for such games is possible under finite-memory assumptions for both the autonomous decision maker and the cyber-adversary. We then describe an experimental testbed to evaluate the efficacy of the proposed framework.

Progressively intricate cyber infiltration mechanisms have made conventional means of defense, such as firewalls and malware detectors, incompetent. These sophisticated infiltration mechanisms can study the defender's behavior, identify security caveats, and modify their actions adaptively. To tackle these security challenges, cyber-infrastructures require active defense techniques that incorporate cyber deception, in which the defender (deceiver) implements a strategy to mislead the infiltrator. To this end, we use a two-player partially observable stochastic game (POSG) framework, wherein the deceiver has full observability over the states of the POSG, and the infiltrator has partial observability. Then, the deception problem is to compute a strategy for the deceiver that minimizes the expected cost of deception against all strategies of the infiltrator. We first show that the underlying problem is a robust mixed-integer linear program, which is intractable to solve in general. Towards a scalable approach, we compute optimal finite-memory strategies for the infiltrator by a reduction to a series of synthesis problems for parametric Markov decision processes. We use these infiltration strategies to find robust strategies for the deceiver using mixed-integer linear programming. We illustrate the performance of our technique on a POSG model for network security. Our experiments demonstrate that the proposed approach handles scenarios considerably larger than those of the state-of-the-art methods.

Partially observable stochastic games (POSGs) provide a rich mathematical framework for planning under uncertainty by a group of agents. However, this modeling advantage comes with a price, namely computation cost. Solving POSGs optimally quickly becomes intractable after a few decision cycles. Our main contribution is to provide bounded approximation techniques which enable us to scale POSG algorithms by several orders of magnitude. We study both the general POSGs and its cooperative counterpart DEC-POMDPs. Experiments on a number of problems confirm the scalability of our approach while still providing useful policies.

It is known that determinining whether a DEC-POMDP, namely, a cooperative partially observable stochastic game (POSG), has a cooperative strategy with positive expected reward is complete for NEXP. It was not known until now how cooperation affected that complexity. We show that, for competitive POSGs, the complexity of determining whether one team has a positive-expected-reward strategy is complete for the class NEXP with an oracle for NP.